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FOREWORD
On November 23, 2013, China’s Ministry of National Defense spokesman announced that a new air
defense intercept zone (ADIZ) will be established by
the government to include the Diaoyu, or Senkaku Islands. Sovereignty over these islands is disputed by Japan, China, and Taiwan. The new ADIZ also included
a submerged rock that falls inside overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) claimed by China, Japan,
and South Korea. Pundits and policy analysts quickly
engaged in a broad debate about whether China’s expanded ADIZ is designed to create tension in Asia, or
is part of a broader plan to impose a new definition
of China’s territorial space in the Asia-Pacific region.
Meanwhile, to deal with cyber penetrations attributed
to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the
U.S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and
State are devising new means to protect intellectual
property and secrets from the PLA’s computer network operations.
Dr. Larry M. Wortzel’s monograph puts these
events into perspective. The ADIZ announcement by
China, at one level, is an example of the PLA General Political Department engagement in what it calls
“legal warfare,” part of the PLA’s “three warfares.”
In expanding its ADIZ, China is stretching International Civil Aviation Organization regulations to reinforce its territorial claims over the Senkaku Islands,
administered by Japan. China calls these the Diaoyu
Islands and, along with Taiwan, claims them for its
own. On another level, the Chinese government will
use the ADIZ as a way to increase the airspace it can
monitor and control off its coast; it already is suing the
navy and maritime law enforcement ships to enforce
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these claims at sea. Additionally, the PLA and the Chinese government have sent a major signal to Taiwan,
demonstrating another aspect of the “three warfares.”
When the Chinese Ministry of National Defense put
its expanded ADIZ into effect, the new zone carefully
avoided any infringement into Taiwan’s ADIZ, signaling that in addition to the improved economic ties
with Taiwan, there is room for political improvement
across the Taiwan Strait.
The PLA spent more than a decade examining U.S.
military publications on network-centric warfare and
the evolution of American doctrine on information
warfare. After observing American information operations in the Balkans and the first Gulf War, the PLA
saw the effect of modern information operations on
the battlefield and in the international arena. The PLA
then began to implement its own form of information
warfare. The Chinese military has adopted information warfare concepts suited to its own organization
and doctrine, blending its own traditional tactics, concepts from the Soviet military, and U.S. doctrine to
bring the PLA into the information age. At the same
time, the PLA has modernized and improved upon its
own psychological warfare operations and expanded
the role for its legal scholars in justifying military
action and territorial claims.
The PLA’s command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs support the ground forces, navy,
air force, missile forces, nuclear doctrine, and space
warfare. China’s military doctrine depends on incorporating information technology and networked information operations. The PLA’s operational concepts
for employing traditional signals intelligence and
electronic warfare have expanded to include cyber
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warfare; kinetic and cyber attacks on satellites; and
information confrontation operations across the electromagnetic spectrum. In doing so, as Dr. Wortzel’s
monograph explains, the PLA used innovative means
to expand on Cold War Soviet doctrine on “radioelectronic combat,” which called for a combination
of jamming and precision air, missile and artillery
strikes on North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces.
The Chinese military, however, apparently intends to
conduct these activities at the tactical, operational and
strategic levels of war, envisioning attacks on an enemy’s homeland critical infrastructure and points of
embarkation.
Along with these more technical aspects of information operations, the PLA’s combination of psychological warfare; the manipulation of public opinion,
or media warfare; and the manipulation of legal arguments to strengthen China’s diplomatic and security
position—or what China calls “legal warfare”—join
together in a comprehensive information operations
doctrine. This monograph explains how the PLA is
revising its operational doctrine to meet what it sees
as the new mode of “integrated, joint operations” for
the 21st century. An understanding of thee PLA’s new
concepts are important for U.S. and allied military
leaders and planners.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
On November 23, 2013, China’s Ministry of National Defense spokesman announced that a new air
defense intercept zone (ADIZ) will be established by
the government to include the Diaoyu, or Senkaku Islands. Sovereignty over these islands is disputed by
Japan, China, and Taiwan. Pundits and policy analysts quickly engaged in a broad debate about whether
China’s expanded ADIZ is designed to create tension
in Asia, or is part of a broader plan to impose a new
definition of China’s territorial space in the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, to deal with cyber penetrations
attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(PLA), the U.S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State are devising new means to protect
intellectual property and secrets from the PLA’s computer network operations.
The ADIZ announcement by China is an example
of the PLA General Political Department engagement
in what it calls “legal warfare,” part of the PLA’s “three
warfares.” In expanding its ADIZ, China is stretching
International Civil Aviation Organization regulations
to reinforce its territorial claims over the Senkaku
Islands. On another level, the Chinese government
will use the ADIZ as a way to increase the airspace
it can monitor and control off its coast; the Chinese
government is already suing the navy and maritime
law enforcement ships to enforce these claims at sea.
Additionally, the PLA and the Chinese government
have sent a major signal to Taiwan, demonstrating
another aspect of the “three warfares.” When the Chinese Ministry of National Defense put its expanded
ADIZ into effect, the new zone carefully avoided any
infringement into Taiwan’s ADIZ, signaling that in
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addition to the improved economic ties with Taiwan,
there is room for political improvement across the
Taiwan Strait.
The PLA spent more than a decade examining U.S.
military publications on network-centric warfare and
the evolution of American doctrine on information
warfare. After observing American information operations in the Balkans and the first Gulf War, the PLA
saw the effect of modern information operations on
the battlefield and in the international arena. The PLA
then began to implement its own form of information
warfare. The Chinese military has adopted information warfare concepts suited to its own organization
and doctrine—blending its own traditional tactics,
concepts from the Soviet military, and U.S. doctrine
to bring the PLA into the information age. At the same
time, the PLA has modernized and improved upon its
own psychological warfare operations and expanded the role of its legal scholars in justifying military
action and territorial claims.
The PLA’s command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs support the ground forces, navy,
air force, missile forces, nuclear doctrine, and space
warfare. China’s military doctrine depends on incorporating information technology and networked information operations. The PLA’s operational concepts
for employing traditional signals intelligence and
electronic warfare have expanded to include cyber
warfare; kinetic and cyber attacks on satellites; and information confrontation operations across the electromagnetic spectrum. As this monograph explains, the
PLA used innovative means to expand on Cold War
Soviet doctrine on “radio-electronic combat,” which
called for a combination of jamming and precision air,
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missile, and artillery strikes on North Atlantic Treaty
Organization forces. The Chinese military, however,
apparently intends to conduct these activities at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, envisioning attacks on an enemy’s homeland critical infrastructure and points of embarkation.
Along with these more technical aspects of information operations, the PLA’s combination of psychological warfare; the manipulation of public opinion,
or media warfare; and the manipulation of legal arguments to strengthen China’s diplomatic and security position, or what China calls “legal warfare,” join
together in a comprehensive information operations
doctrine. This monograph explains how the PLA is
revising its operational doctrine to meet what it sees
as the new mode of “integrated, joint operations”
for the 21st century. An understanding of the PLA’s
new concepts is important for U.S. and allied military
leaders and planners.
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THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY
AND INFORMATION WARFARE1
CHINA’S MILITARY IMPLEMENTS
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
spent a decade or so examining U.S. military publications on network-centric warfare and the evolution
of American doctrine on information warfare. For a
while, this was an all new and interesting theory to
the PLA, but after observing American information
operations in the Balkans and the first Gulf War, the
PLA saw the effect of modern information operations
on the battlefield and in the international arena. The
PLA then began to implement its own form of information warfare. Over a 20-year period, the Chinese
military has adopted information warfare concepts
suited to its own organization and doctrine—blending
its own traditional tactics, concepts from the Soviet
military, and U.S. doctrine to bring the PLA into the
information age.
The PLA’s command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) programs support the ground forces,
navy, air force, missile forces, nuclear doctrine, and
space warfare. China’s military doctrine depends on
incorporating information technology and networked
information operations. The PLA’s warfighting concepts for employing signals intelligence and electronic warfare have expanded to include cyber warfare,
attacks on satellites, and information confrontation
operations (xinxi duikang zuozhan).2 Along with these
more technical aspects of information operations,
the PLA’s combination of psychological warfare; the
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manipulation of public opinion, or media warfare;
and the manipulation of legal arguments to strengthen China’s diplomatic and security position, or what
China calls “legal warfare,” join together in a comprehensive information operations doctrine.
INFORMATION AGE WARFARE AND
INTEGRATED NETWORK
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
In modern military operations, it is nearly impossible to find forms of military activity that do not in
some way depend on information technology. Navigation and positioning is no longer done with compasses
or sextants, maps, or charts; it is done with satellite
broadcasts. Physical reconnaissance is complemented
by electronic means and a range of sensors employed
on land or in the in air, sea, and space. Information
systems support logistics activities, such as resupply
and refueling, and facilitate personnel and casualty
management. Information technology and instantaneous data exchange provide commanders and deployed forces with a shared awareness of the battle
area. In most military organizations, units that were
engaged in signals intelligence collection and electronic warfare also have taken on the mission of cyber
warfare and cyber penetration.
During World War II and into the Cold War, opposing forces used electronic warfare techniques
such as jamming, imitative communications deception, and meaconing (the interception, alteration, and
rebroacasting of navigation signals) to disrupt an
adversary’s communication system and radar or to
alter electromagnetic signals. In the information age,
similar actions are possible, and cyber exploitation or

2

attacks can supplement electronic warfare. This matters because operational concepts such as cooperative
target engagement—in which different combat platforms in the air, on the sea, on land, or on submarine
share data on a target and fire at it simultaneously
from various directions with different weapons—are
based on information systems being linked. These linkages, however, also create opportunities for systemswide attacks.
For the PLA, information warfare is directed at
“the enemy’s information detection sources, information channels, and information-processing and decision making systems.”3 The goals are information superiority, disruption of the enemy information control
capabilities, and maintaining one’s own information
systems and capabilities.
In the age of information operations, militaries that
embrace information systems have begun to think
about information dominance, or the ability to identify
a range of threats against their own forces; to counter
them; and to attack the enemy’s information systems.4
The PLA is working to create an information-based
“system of systems operations capability that forms an
all-inclusive master network.”5 This effort depends on
the redundant national command-and-control architecture that the PLA began to develop in the 1990s. In
July 1997, at an exhibition in the PLA Military History
Museum in Beijing, the author observed an overlay
for a national and theater-level automated commandand-control system.
The PLA’s national command-and-control system
is a redundant military region or theater of war networked system linking the General Staff Department
headquarters and the PLA’s arms and services with
regional combat headquarters and their subordinate
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major organizations. An Indian defense researcher described this Qu Dian system as using fiberoptic cable,
high-frequency and very-high-frequency communications, microwave systems, and multiple satellites to
enable the Central Military Commission, the General
Staff Department, and commanders to communicate
with forces in their theater of war on a real-time basis.6 The system also permits data transfer among
the headquarters and all the units under the PLA’s
joint command.
Leaders and military strategists in the PLA observed the transformation taking place in American
and other Western military forces and worked hard to
understand what was happening. The Chinese military moved steadily to take advantage of information
technologies.7 In a New Year’s Day 2006 editorial, the
PLA Daily reminded the armed forces to transform
itself from a force that operates under mechanized
conditions to one that operates under “informatized
conditions.”8 Less than a month before this reminder,
in a testimonial to Hu Jintao’s speech on the historic
missions of the PLA, PLA Daily made it clear that the
military had to “improve integrated combat operations capabilities under informatized conditions.”9
A range of military activities depends on how information technologies make military units and systems “interconnected.” But the PLA still is not fully
able to connect various command posts at different
levels of the military to the national level and to each
other. Nor are all the arms and services of the PLA
fully interconnected yet. The PLA’s goal is to create a
“system of systems in operations” (ti xi zuozhan) that
can coordinate activities across the military inside
and between military regions, arms, and services.10
One objective of the effort is to develop a networked
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command-and-control system inside the PLA at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, ultimately extending from the national command level
to the soldier.11 It is clear, however, that China’s military ultimately envisions an information system or
complex that can ensure that reconnaissance, electronic warfare, cyber systems, and combat strikes are
integrated.12
In their book, The Science of Military Strategy, Peng
Guangqian and Yao Yunzhu highlight the effectiveness of precision-guided weapons and information
age technologies. They note that in the Gulf War,
which depended a great deal on information systems,
“precision-guided weapons made up only 7 percent
of all weapons used by the U.S. military, but they destroyed 80 percent of important targets.”13 Further,
Peng and Yao argue that “under high tech conditions,
the outcome of war not only depends on the amount of
resources, manpower and technology devoted to the
battlefield,” but also on “the control of information on
the battlefield.” Battle effectiveness, they maintain, is
a function of the acquisition, transmission, and management of information.14
The PLA, however, moved into the information
age from a less advantageous position than did the
United States. For decades, military culture in China
emphasized the importance of people, not equipment,
in warfare and employed massed forces or weapons—the strengths China brought to bear in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnam
War.15 Although the PLA had electronic systems, it
did not modernize a force with the intent to use and
even depend on these systems. The educational base
of the average soldier in the PLA is probably lower
than that of American or European soldiers, and the
same is still true of many PLA officers.
5

At all levels of the PLA, however, attitudes about
the relative importance of technology in warfare are
changing. As China’s military moves into the second
decade of the 21st century, it is embracing the information age. The PLA is updating 20th-century mechanized and joint operations, and combining them with
electronic warfare, warfare—what the PLA calls “firepower warfare”—and precision strike. In a book published by the PLA Academy of Military Science, Ye
Zheng describes information age operations as “a new
type of operations that are derived from the basis of
mechanized operations moving from ‘platform-based
operations’ to systematic operations and networkcentric operations.”16
Even though some PLA theorists argue that “the
next 20 years are a period for China’s ‘peaceful rise,’
meaning that China should not threaten others,” this
does not mean that China cannot be prepared to defend itself from aggression.17 Further, information age
warfare involves the Global Information Grid, a term
the U.S. National Security Agency uses to describe
“interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing” information for warfighters and
policymakers.18 For the PLA, this means connecting
global command-and-control systems and global positioning satellites to provide data for strategic operations and theaters of war.19 Ultimately, however, PLA
theorists acknowledge that warfare is about killing
and destruction, “just as mechanization in war made
war more destructive, information age warfare will allow fires to be more destructive.”20
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First “Informatize,” then Network.
Setting the tone for wider implementation of the
PLA’s “informatization,” the General Staff Department explains that the process will be both long and
dynamic.21 The PLA must embrace information age
operations in support of all forms of military operations: in creating space-, ground-, and service-based
system networks by integrating electronic systems in
military regions, and by establishing effective command organizations and structures that will “possess
powerful capabilities with regard to mobile suppression of the enemy [jidong zhi di], long-range strikes
[yuancheng daji], precisions support [jingque baozhang],
and three-dimensional defense [quawei fanghu].”22
Space-based information networks are described
as the “backbone” of any informatization effort for
the PLA. Surface-based systems are the key elements
of the effort, supported by air and sea platforms, and
the “integrated ground air and space elements must
be compatible with the various services and their surrounding regions.”23 The PLA also is concerned about
such matters as bandwidth, which is the basis for the
ability to support a high volume of transmissions and
system survivability and to confront enemy information systems.24
An article in PLA Daily emphasized that today we
are all living on a “smart planet,” which is interconnected, with economic, political, and cultural activities
all available to see on information systems—allowing
military forces to take advantage of this transparency
on the battlefield.25 PLA strategists argue that “battlespace awareness is the core of information age warfare,” which means that one’s forces must be able to
destroy or jam the adversary’s systems that are funda-
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mental to situational awareness. Given this, PLA experts believe that “information age warfare will take
place in a range of strategic battle-space: land, maritime, air, space, and ‘knowledge areas’.”26
Using the same formula for decisionmaking in the
information age relied on by the U.S. Armed Forces,
Ye Zheng tells the PLA that the interaction of systems,
platforms, communications, and decisions shortens
the “OODA [observe, orient, decide, and act, or faxian, juece, jihua, xingdong] loop,” allowing a military
to take action in real time.27 Moreover, as he explains,
in information operations the traditional concepts of
air, land, and sea battlespace expand to include the
electromagnetic spectrum, cyberspace, and space, becoming “virtual battle space” (xu kong jian).28 The PLA
defines this as “the space created by technology, computers and the ‘web’ [Internet] that is subject to human
control and reflects human will.”29 Its components are
cyberspace (saibo kongjian), information space (xinsi
kongjian), and digital space (shuxue kongjian).
The truly distinguishing characteristic of operations in the information age in PLA doctrine, however, is that “information power and various types of
firepower are merged” so that mobility and precision
fires are integrated to increase their operational effects.30 Ultimately, the PLA must execute integrated
operations combining computer network warfare,
networked firepower warfare, electronic warfare, and
sensor systems.
Part of the dilemma for the PLA, however, is to
develop new cyber warfare doctrine appropriate for
the PLA’s level of modernization, while at the same
time taking advantage of the Chinese armed forces’
existing strengths in electronic warfare, electronic
information gathering, precision attack, and massed
firepower.31 		
8

The PLA also lacks a deep reservoir of personnel
who can manage or operate such systems. Chinese
military leaders, however, recognize this weakness
and intend to develop a talent pool of troops who can
conduct or plan joint military operations, manage information systems and cyber technology, and use or
maintain advanced weapon systems.32 The PLA’s goal
is to have these personnel by 2020.
However, the degree to which individual units
or combat platforms are truly integrated into a datasharing and command system varies in the PLA by
service, branch, and arm. In major ground formations
(infantry, armor, artillery), few units are networked
below the regimental level. In the PLA Navy (PLAN),
the majority of surface combatants and submarines
have the communications and data-sharing capabilities to be networked, as do PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
combat and support aircraft and Second Artillery
Corps missile-firing battalions. By comparison, in the
U.S. military, the networked C4ISR system extends to
every major combat platform and organization—often
down to the rifle squad or individual combat vehicle.
All aircraft and ships are in the networked system.
The GSD Communications Department calls for
establishing five major networked systems:
1. Theater-level joint operational command communications and liaison subsystems that will synchronize broadband, multimedia information transmission.
2. Integrated processing subsystems for the operational command services such as message processing,
mapping, simulations, and automated decisionmaking for peacetime, exercises, and wartime.
3. Fixed and mobile or portable theater reconnaissance and detection systems to improve intelligence,
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reconnaissance, detection, information processing,
and the rapid relay of such information to other defense posts, ports, stations, and substations. These
should be able to cover four levels of units: military
regions, group army-level organizations, divisions or
brigades, and regiments. They should include such
arms as air defense and missile units.
4. Electronic countermeasures and intelligence
database systems that can integrate and share electromagnetic intelligence among headquarters, service
arms in a theater of war, command posts at different
levels, and reconnaissance stations.
5. Theater subsystems for political work operations, logistics, equipment monitoring, managing information systems, and managing theater-level intelligence-integrated processing systems.33
The Communications Department, however, anticipates challenges in reaching its goals. One problem
is that the PLA cannot include units at the lower echelons in its communication and data exchange information networks. For the ground forces, in 2004, the
information network extended only to the regimental
level. By 2013, battalion command posts seem to be
included in the network. The PLA wants to integrate
information attack, attacks on enemy C4ISR systems,
and precision strikes in “integrated network electronic
warfare [INEW],” discussed later in this monograph.34
In An Introduction to Informationalized Operations,
Ye Zheng explains that the PLA concept of informationalized operations means “networked firepower
warfare employed across the domains of war.”35 The
Chinese military realizes that integrated network
electronic warfare attacks must be combined with integrated firepower warfare. This use of precision fires
includes beyond-visual-range fires.36
10

To a great extent, when one analyzes the PLA’s
INEW doctrine, it is similar to the concept of radioelectronic combat (REC) in Cold War-Soviet military
doctrine.37 China’s military, however, has added additional dimensions to this older concept. Taking a cue
from U.S. operations in Iraq and the Balkans, China has
moved beyond the tactical and theater realm of operations to elevate integrated network electronic warfare
to a strategic level of war. Also, the PLA has added cyber attacks and attacks on satellites, or space warfare,
to its offensive operations. Dai Qingmin envisions future combat operations focusing on “the destruction
and control of the enemy’s information infrastructure
and strategic life blood, selecting key enemy targets,
and launching effective network-electronic attacks.”38
In doing so, the PLA expects to weaken and paralyze
an enemy’s decisionmaking and also to weaken and
paralyze the political, economic, and military aspects
of the enemy’s entire war potential. This suggests that
INEW operations would take place within a theater of
war but would also extend to an enemy’s homeland,
including the civil infrastructure and the economy.39
The concepts applied by the PLA are derivatives of
both Soviet and American doctrine, as discussed earlier. A major contribution from U.S. doctrine resulted
from the PLA’s research into the U.S. Navy’s writings
about network-centric warfare.40
One American researcher characterizes the PLA’s
efforts at information age warfare as “a focused transformation of the nation’s mode of thinking” to integrate traditional and mechanized military operations
into a “systems-oriented environment characterized
by rapidly changing time-space relationships.”41 Just
as INEW theory seems to have evolved from Chinese
research into Soviet military doctrine, the PLA’s ideas

11

on expanding REC to include information operations
and space attacks were based on observations by China’s military thinkers of U.S. and allied operations in
Iraq and Kosovo.42
This mode of thinking involved maintaining information superiority over an adversary; integrating
air, ground, and naval warfare; and taking “command
and control of forces as a major part of military science.”43 In essence, for the PLA, the information and
communication networks of engaged forces became
the focal point for the conduct of military operations,
as well as for finding and engaging enemy forces.
Wang Zhengde conceived it as “merging weapons,
equipment, resources, operational structure, and information resources to enable operational troops to
truly form a grand system that fully exploits overall
effectiveness.”44
If we take Wang’s embrace of information warfare
concepts as a barometer of how the PLA approached
the concept, by 2007 the threads of integrated network
electronic warfare begin to emerge. In the book, On
Informationalized Confrontation, he explores warfare
(or military confrontation) in the electronic realm (dianzi lingyu duikang). Wang argues that “both sides in
any conflict want control of the electromagnetic spectrum,” making jamming and electronic countermeasures critical parts of military operations.45 Further, as
the PLA and other militaries evolve in the information
age and come to depend on networks, the PLA’s effort
at informationalized confrontation evolves into “network confrontation operations,” in which each side in
a conflict is seeking to immobilize the other’s communications, data, command, and sensor networks.46
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INEW, Computer Network Warfare,
and Strike.
One way to understand what the PLA is doing to
expand and modernize what it learned is to think of
Soviet REC on Chinese steroids. That is, by combining electronic warfare and precision strikes and adding cyber warfare and attacks on space systems, the
PLA believes it can improve operational success on
the modern battlefield.47
China’s military strategists expand the Soviet concept further. Whereas the Soviet military applied REC
to tactical situations in a limited battlespace or within
a theater of operations, such as Europe, PLA military
theorists introduce strategic attacks on an adversary’s
homeland sustainment and supply systems. This new
doctrine, as China’s armed forces envision it, extends
across all levels of warfare, from the tactical battlefield
to the theater of operations and to the strategic level
of war. None of these effects can be achieved without
the PLA realizing its objectives in integrated, or networked, operations.48
China’s military researchers are aware of the Soviet REC doctrine and acknowledge the goals that the
Soviet military set for REC.49 In conceiving the REC
concept during the Cold War, the Soviets expected
their forces would inflict 60-percent casualties or combat damage on enemy forces through a combination
of traditional electronic warfare and combat strikes
by aircraft, helicopters, missiles, rockets, and artillery in the opening moves of any conflict.50 The Soviet
military goal was to destroy “30 percent by jamming
and 30 percent by destructive fires.”51 The U.S. Army
described REC as “the total integration of EW [electronic warfare] and physical destruction resources to
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deny us the use of our electronic systems.”52 Chinese
researchers imply that in the information age, by adding in cyber warfare and attacks on space systems, the
PLA can improve on the Soviet casualty ratios, even if
they do not give specific numbers.53
Soviet REC was part of a broader operational campaign. Soviet forces intended to employ radio-direction finding, signals and radar intercept, and artillery
radars to attack U.S. troop formations and headquarters—in addition to electronic systems to support
strikes by artillery, combat aircraft, helicopters, and
rockets or missiles. Among some of the measures included in Soviet REC operations were suppressive
fires, jamming an adversary’s communications assets,
deceptively entering an adversary’s radio nets, and
interfering with the normal flow of an adversary’s
communications.54
Starting in the 1970s, the American response to
Soviet doctrine, in the event of war in Europe, was
AirLand Battle, an integrated attack plan using airpower, special operations forces, artillery, armor, and
electronic warfare.55 The United States also employed
AirLand Battle doctrine in the Gulf War during the
campaign to drive the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, a
campaign that the PLA studied with intense interest.56
Ultimately, the PLA rolled all these concepts into
what it now terms “integrated network electronic
warfare,” or INEW. On the information systems side
of China’s INEW planning, Ye Zheng discusses integrated network information attack (wangdian yiti xinxi
gongji) as integrating electronic warfare and computer
warfare to destroy the enemy’s information systems
and to preserve one’s own.57 Other PLA operations experts, however, expand the concept to include attacking and destroying enemy equipment and personnel,
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bringing the PLA’s doctrine in line with the way that
the Soviet Union conceived REC doctrine.
Chinese military thinkers built on the American
concept of network-centric warfare to introduce concepts such as precision weapon strikes and the use of
space-based and battlefield sensors with the goal of
moving away from what one Chinese strategist called
“obsolete and rigid conceptual thinking.”58 Unlike
the Soviet publications on REC, Chinese publications
do not give explicit estimates of battle casualties. As
explained by Major General Dai Qingmin, then director of the PLA General Staff Department’s Electronic
Warfare and Electronic Countermeasures Department
(Dianzi Duikang/Leida Bu, aka, the Fourth Department), the operational concepts are similar. However,
the PLA expands on and modernizes REC doctrine
by including “the integrated use of electronic warfare
and computer network warfare . . . to paralyze an opponent’s information systems.”59 These concepts are
incorporated into military exercises, including “forceon-force” confrontation, in which a “red” unit, representing the PLA, is in confrontation with a “blue”
unit, representing the enemy—an advanced military
force capable of operating at the highest levels of
information age warfare.60
INEW is a “systems-versus-systems” form of
military confrontation on the 21st-century battlefield,
dependent on space, cyber, and various information
technologies.61 One objective is to destroy the enemy’s
C4ISR, to blind the enemy and prevent enemy forces
and commanders from communicating. But the PLA
also wants to inflict battlefield casualties on an enemy
force and to disrupt logistics, resupply, and personnel systems in the enemy’s homeland so that combat
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losses cannot be restored and the deployed force cannot sustain battle. As Dai Qingmin states:
after the information attack succeeds in suppressing
the enemy, the enemy’s plight of temporary ‘blindness, deafness, and even paralysis’ can be exploited for
the quick organization of an ‘information/firepower’
assault.62

Dai advocates integrating “soft and hard attacks,”
employing information suppression, information
warfare, and the firepower of missiles.”63
Other cyber warfare strategists, such as Xu Rongsheng, chief of cyber security research at the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, writes that in wartime, cyber
warfare should be targeted to “disrupt and damage
the networks of infrastructure facilities, such as power
systems, telecommunications systems, and educational systems.”64 This approach is not something new in
the PLA; the two PLA senior colonels who wrote the
book, Unrestricted Warfare, introduced these concepts
in 1999.65 However, it took people like Dai Qingmin
to formalize these ideas as military doctrine. As for
those Western-based specialists on China and journalists who dismissed Unrestricted Warfare when it was
published because it was written by two PLA political
commissars, it should be noted that by 2011, one of
them (Qiao Liang) was a major general at the PLAAF
Command College.
Cyber Warfare.
PLA military thinkers include cyber warfare as
part of information age warfare. Cyber warfare takes
place in the electromagnetic spectrum; thus, there is a
good deal of conceptual and operational overlap with
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traditional electronic warfare. These operations are
designed to penetrate, exploit, and perhaps damage
or sabotage, through electronic means, an adversary’s
“information systems and networks, computers and
communications systems, and supporting infrastructures.”66 As outlined above, cyber operations are a
component of INEW. Cyber operations also are closely
linked to operations in space and to traditional forms
of espionage or information-gathering. Indeed, most
thinking about cyber warfare in China is “an extension of its traditional strategic thinking.”67
China, like other states, is heavily involved in
computer network operations. They are conducted
primarily for five reasons:
1. To strengthen political and economic control in
China;
2. To complement other forms of intelligence collection and gather economic, military, or technology
intelligence and information;
3. To reconnoiter, map, and gather targeting information in foreign military, government, civil infrastructure, or corporate networks for later exploitation
or attack;
4. To conduct the exploitation or attacks using the
collected information; and,
5. To develop defenses or conduct defensive operations in the PLA (and China’s) own cyber systems.68
With respect to strengthening political and economic control in China, skilled computer operators
exploit computer systems to gain information about
what political dissidents say, how they use the World
Wide Web, and with whom they communicate. The
organizations in China most likely to engage in these
activities, however, are those responsible for internal
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security, repression, and control of the Chinese population, and control over the distribution of information. These are the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the system of Public
Security Bureaus and People’s Armed Police the MPS
oversees, and organizations of the Communist Party
such as the Central Propaganda Department.69 Still,
the PLA has the expertise to conduct such operations
and is sometimes involved.70
The second type of malicious activity, essentially,
is intelligence gathering designed to collect information of military, technical, scientific, or economic
value. Gathering this intelligence information may
speed the development and fielding of weapons in
China and improve technology in sectors of China’s
industries while saving time and money in research
and development; it often compromises valuable intellectual property. The organizations of the Chinese
government with the missions and capabilities to
conduct such activities span both military and civilian agencies in China, to include the PLA’s Technical
Reconnaissance Department (aka Signals Intelligence,
or the Third Department), the Electronic Countermeasures and Electronic Countermeasures Department
(aka the Fourth Department), the Ministry of State
Security, and the state-owned companies in China’s
broad military-industrial complex.71 Foreign business
visitors to China with whom the author has had contact also have reported that in some localities Public
Security Bureau personnel have cooperated with local
authorities to gather information of economic value.
Reconnoitering, mapping, and gathering targeting information in foreign military, government, civil
infrastructure, or corporate networks for later exploitation or attack may be the most dangerous cyber
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activity for American national security. This is where
foreign intelligence or military services penetrate the
computers that control our vital national infrastructure or our military, reconnoiter them electronically,
and map or target nodes in the systems for future
penetration or attack. Malicious code is often left behind to facilitate future entry. Regarding this third
type of computer network penetration by China, the
danger is that it could lead to a devastating computer
attack. General James Cartwright, then commander
of the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and
recently vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
said, “I don’t think the [United States] has gotten its
head around the issue yet, but I think that we should
start to consider that [effects] associated with a cyberattack could, in fact, be in the magnitude of a weapon
of mass destruction.”72
General Cartwright testified in 2007 before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission that China is actively engaging in cyber reconnaissance by probing the computer networks of U.S.
Government agencies as well as private companies.73
A denial-of-service attack by China has the potential
to cause cataclysmic harm if conducted against the
United States on a large scale; it could paralyze critical infrastructure or military command and control.
China currently is thought by many analysts to have
the world’s largest denial-of-service capability.74 In
2010 former National Security Agency director and
director of National Intelligence Admiral Mike McConnell reinforced General Cartwright’s admonition.
He argued that just as during the Cold War, when the
United States aimed to protect itself against nuclear
attack, today it must endeavor to protect its “power
grids, air and ground transportation, telecommunica-

19

tions, and water filtration systems” against the chaos
that could result from successful cyber attacks.75
PLA Lieutenant General Liu Jixian, of the PLA’s
Academy of Military Science, writes that the PLA must
develop asymmetrical capabilities against potential
enemies, including space-based information support
and networked-focused “soft attack.”76 Xu Rongsheng
told a Chinese news reporter that:
cyber warfare may be carried out in two ways. In
wartimes, disrupt and damage the networks of infrastructure facilities, such as power systems, telecommunications systems, and education systems, in a
country; or in military engagements, the cyber technology of the military forces can be turned into combat
capabilities.77

Other military strategists from China’s military
academies and schools of warfare theory have suggested that the PLA ought to have the capability to
alter information in military command-and-control
or logistics systems to deceive U.S. forces on resupply
missions or divert supplies. They say it also should be
able to paralyze ports and airports by cyber or precision-weapon attacks on critical infrastructure.78
Although armed conflict between the United States
and China is not a certainty, a cyber war already is under way, and besides penetrations for intelligence collection, there are regular attacks on the United States
from sites in China.79 PLA organizations are being
trained and prepared in military doctrine to “expand
the types of targets or objectives for armed conflict to
command-and-control systems, communications systems and infrastructure.”80 Military strategist Wang
Pufeng argues that “battlefield situational awareness
is the core of information age warfare, which means
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that one must be able to destroy or jam the systems
that are fundamental to [an adversary’s] situational
awareness.”81
With regard to information warfare, Wang Baocun, one of the leading information warfare specialists
in the Chinese military, reminds readers in China that
“the global information grid and global commandand-control systems are fundamental to the American
defense system, including global positioning satellites.”82 Other Chinese military publications suggest
that to be successful in information age warfare, one’s
own military must have certain capabilities and must
be able to interfere with an adversary’s ability to exploit the results of “reconnaissance, thermal imaging,
ballistic missile warning, and radar sensing.”83
PLA Responsibilities and Cyber Penetrations,
Exploitation, Espionage, and Warfare.
In terms of organizations, the PLA has divided responsibility for the conduct of electronic warfare, electronic defense, the collection of signals intelligence,
and cyber operations. Notwithstanding the divided
responsibilities, the Chinese military is well equipped
and staffed to conduct such activities.84
The Third Department (Technical Reconnaissance
Department, or Jishu Zhencha Bu) of the PLA’s General
Staff Department is responsible for technology reconnaissance, or signals collection, exploitation, and analysis, as well as communications security for the PLA.85
The Third Department is often compared to the U.S.
National Security Agency. Third Department intelligence officers are trained for various forms of electronic
warfare and electronic espionage, but they apparently
are also trained for similar activities in the realm of
cyber operations.
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The GSD’s Fourth Department (Electronic Warfare and Electronic Countermeasures Department)
is responsible for offensive electronic warfare and
electronic countermeasures, such as the jamming
and counter-jamming of various types of signals or
communications.86 Fourth Department personnel
are skilled in electronic warfare and, according to a
Northrop Grumman Corporation study, they are also
probably charged with cyber penetrations.87
Given the Third Department’s analytical and language capabilities, its personnel probably analyze and
exploit the cyber information gathered in Fourth Department offensive actions. Each of China’s military
regions, as well as the PLAAF, PLAN, and Secondary
Artillery Force (SAF), has assigned to its headquarters
department at least one technical reconnaissance bureau subordinate to the Third Department that monitors foreign communications (and cyber activity).88 In
addition to the technical reconnaissance bureaus assigned to the military regions, Project 2049 Institute
also documents more Third Department organizations, including three research institutes, four operational centers, and twelve operational bureaus that
have a regional or functional orientation. This orientation can monitor phone, radio, satellite, or computer
communications.89 In the military regions, arms, and
services, the technical research bureau alignment is:
• Beijing: 1
• Chengdu: 2
• Guangzhou: 1
• Jinan: 1
• Lanzhou: 2
• Nanjing: 2
• Shenyang: 1
• PLAAF: 3
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• PLAN: 2
• SAF: 190
Penetrations of U.S. Government agencies and
defense contractors attributed to organizations in
China had been detected for some time prior to the
2006 penetration. The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) suffered a series of other
breaches attributed to Russia and China.91 In Time
magazine, one author opened the door on a series of
Chinese breaches of U.S. Government and industry
systems, introducing the efforts of a computer specialist who tracked breaches into Department of Energy
systems—“following the e-trail to China.”92 But cyber
penetrations traced back to China have plagued U.S.
contractors and agencies for a year or so before this.
A second Time article explained how a computer security analyst at a Department of Energy facility, Sandia National Laboratory, traced computer attacks and
penetrations he detected to Guangdong Province.93
Guangzhou Military Region, which includes Guangdong Province, is the site of another of the PLA’s technical reconnaissance regiments.
It is difficult at times to distinguish the origin of a
cyber attack or penetration, and attribution of a cyber
operation is not always possible. The PLA may be acting through its Third or Fourth Departments or the
Ministry of State Security may be acting. The origin
might be from groups known as “patriotic hackers”
(even if the PLA sometimes uses such groups), or it
could be some company or organization in China engaged in electronic espionage.94 That said, it is clear
that in terms of its military doctrine and approaches
to modern warfare—whether one calls it the informational, electromagnetic, or cyber domain of war—the
PLA has embraced the medium.
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Three former U.S. officials—Admiral McConnell;
Michael Chertoff, former secretary of Homeland Security; and William Lynn, former deputy secretary
of defense—said in a January 2012 Wall Street Journal
opinion piece that “the Chinese government has a national policy of espionage in cyberspace. In fact, the
Chinese are the world’s most active and persistent
practitioners of cyber espionage today.” They pointed
out in the same op-ed that “it is more efficient for the
Chinese to steal innovations and intellectual property
than to incur the cost and time of creating their own.”95
Further, there are very clear linkages between
China’s traditional espionage efforts against military
technologies and the targets of cyber espionage; the
target sets are roughly the same. The U.S. Department
of Justice has prosecuted a number of cases in which
long-term Chinese agents working for defense companies sent back to China information on naval propulsion systems, naval electronic control systems, and
stealth aircraft design. For the most part, these agents
were convicted of economic espionage—violation of
laws prohibiting the transfer of military-related information to China.96 These are some of the same targets
of Chinese cyber espionage.
In a 2011 report, the U.S. National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), an agency subordinate to the
Directorate of National Intelligence, made the point
that cyberspace is unique because it provides foreign
intelligence “collectors with relative anonymity, facilitates the transfer of vast amounts of information, and
makes it more difficult for victim and governments to
assign blame by masking geographic locations.”97 The
Directorate added that “Chinese actors are the world’s
most active and persistent perpetrators of economic
espionage.”98 The Northrop Grumman Corporation,
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in a second report for the U.S. China Economic and
Security Review Commission in 2012, suggests that
when “highly technical defense engineering information, operational military data, or government policy
analysis is the target of a cyber penetration from China,” it probably is not the act of a criminal group.99
According to The Washington Post, China has managed to gather data on “more than two dozen major
weapons systems” by breaching design data stored on
computers.100 The compromises reportedly included
information on Patriot anti-missile and air defense
systems, the V-22 Osprey aircraft, the Navy’s Littoral
Combat Ship and F/A-18 fighter, and the F-35 strike
fighter, among other systems. One computer security
firm, Mandiant, in a report on computer threats, reported that on average, companies go 243 days with
attackers on their networks extracting information before detecting the activity.101 In a report on a detailed
investigation it conducted on one PLA Technical Reconnaissance Bureau unit based in Shanghai, the 61398
unit, Mandiant exposed the identities of several of the
unit’s soldiers involved in hacking U.S. systems.102
These reports make it clear that besides a robust cyber
and electronic warfare program, the PLA is supporting China’s national defense, science, and technology
development through cyber espionage.
Implications for the United States.
Considering how China is approaching war and
the electromagnetic spectrum, the PLA is a worldclass player in the cyber domain. China’s cyber warriors have been able to penetrate computer systems,
steal or manipulate data, and engage in electronic
warfare on a global basis. The governments of the
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United States, Australia, Japan, Germany, and Great
Britain, to name a few, all have tracked cyber penetrations back to China. Much of this activity, given the
nature of the defense-related systems that are being
exploited, probably traces back to the PLA or goes to
support defense production in China that helps the
PLA. In addition, military publications in China make
it clear that the PLA intends to use computer network
operations in conflicts, along with integrated network
electronic warfare.
PLA military planners and strategists are aware
of the strengths and weaknesses in China’s armed
forces. There are limitations of how far the PLA, especially the PLA Army, can go in embracing information systems. PLA leaders understand that given the
education base of many of the soldiers brought into
the PLA, not every soldier will be able to function in
a fully automated, computer-driven environment, nor
will all soldiers be able to use or even have access to
information systems. Still, the PLA is doing an excellent job of adapting these technologies to its forces.
Moreover, China’s military thinkers are developing
their own doctrine and no longer depend on what
they see happening in the U.S. Armed Forces or other
militaries.
Two decades ago, in the wake of the U.S.-led coalition action in Iraq, the PLA realized that its military
was not ready to take on a modern adversary that
used networked C4ISR systems. For almost a decade,
virtually all of the publications from PLA institutions
quoted from or cited American military doctrine or
manuals. Beginning in the mid-2000s, however, Chinese military thinkers began to develop indigenous
doctrine on information systems and operations in the
information age. Moreover, the PLA is fielding equip-
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ment, satellites, and communications systems to support information age operations.
The transition to information age operations has
not reached down into every level of the PLA. In the
SAC, it appears that full automation, information
flows, and data flows only extend down to the missilefiring brigades.103 But one can be sure that individual
missile batteries can take advantage of limited data
links and satellite-based timing and positioning data.
In the PLAN, all of the major combat ships are networked and can share data. In the PLAAF, a majority
of newer fighter aircraft are able to share data and be
part of an information system managed by the PLA’s
own airborne early-warning aircraft. For the ground
forces, automation and information age systems appear to have penetrated down to the regimental level.
By comparison, in the U.S. military, data exchange and
situational awareness extend to squads and weapon
crews—in some cases to individual Soldiers, Sailors,
Marines or Airmen.
Some in the PLA believe that because the United
States operates its forces over extended distances and
depends on satellites and information systems, it has
a weakness that can be exploited in conflict. They take
comfort in the fact that the PLA does not depend as
much on information sharing as does the U.S military.
But what the PLA sees as one of its strengths is becoming a weakness, because as Chinese forces depend
more on information systems, they become more vulnerable to interference, manipulation, and jamming.
In a notional assessment of how the PLA could
exploit some of the weaknesses it sees in the U.S. dependence on information systems, researchers at the
Northrop Grumman Corporation point out weaknesses in the unclassified Internet systems used by the
U.S. armed forces.104 The U.S. military operates two
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forms of Internet protocols. The Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) is part of the Defense
Data Network, wich carries classified information. So
far, Department of Defense (DoD) authorities do not
believe that it has been penetrated. The Non-secure
Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) carries
sensitive, but unclassified, information. It has suffered
a number of penetrations, many of which have been
traced back to China. PLA publications consistently
identify “U.S. logistics and C4ISR systems as the most
important centers of gravity to target in a conflict.”105
Unfortunately, vital logistical, personnel, and
unit movement data are all carried on the nonsecure
NIPRNET, and this network likely already has been
mapped and penetrated by the PLA. This leaves the
U.S. military open for exploitation by PLA forces in the
event of a conflict. The PLA’s emphasis on surprise,
striking the enemy’s center of gravity, and achieving
information superiority means that in the event of a
conflict, the PLA would likely initiate cyber and electronic warfare first, in the Asia-Pacific region, in the
United States, and around the globe.
The PLA is not solely focused on information superiority in the cyber and electromagnetic spectrum.
The General Political Department (GPD)—often in coordination with the Communist Party’s International
Liaison Department, its Propaganda Department, and
military intelligence—also has modernized traditional
propaganda and psychological operations for wars in
the information age.
The United States also must think through how
it intends to respond to the PLA’s cyber operations.
Defensive measures are important, but, increasingly,
Congress and American companies are discussing the
potential for offensive cyber operations designed to
disrupt the networks of attackers and of “honeypots,”
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or traps designed to lure in a hacker and either allow
the attacker to extract bad information or to attack the
hacker’s system.
THE GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS
The GPD is broadly responsible for Communist
Party political and ideological training in the PLA.
That covers a wide range of activities, from building
troop morale through cultural shows, movies, the arts,
and literature, to supporting museums and sports activities.106 More importantly for the PLA and the Communist Party’s internal security, the GPD serves as a
personnel department, controlling dossiers on the political reliability of troops and officers, their training
records, their security clearances, and their promotions. Internally, framing and molding public opinion
through the media also falls to the GPD.107 This department works closely with other Communist Party
organizations, especially the International Liaison Department, the Propaganda Department, and the Organization Department—a central Chinese Communist
Party organization that keeps track of the careers, advancement, and personnel dossiers of 70 million party
members. In some cases, the GPD also works hand
in hand with the PLA’s Second Department (Military
Intelligence).
As if the GPD’s responsibilities were not broad
enough, in 2003, the Communist Party’s Central
Committee and the Central Military Commission approved a new warfare concept for the PLA, the “three
warfares” (san zhong zhanfa, generally abbreviated in
Chinese as san zhan).108 These are: (1) public opinion
(media) warfare (yulun zhan); (2) psychological war-
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fare (xinli zhan); and, (3) legal warfare (falu zhan).109
The PLA Daily makes it clear that the three warfares
doctrine is part of the PLA regulations for the conduct
of “political work.”110 These three forms of political or
information warfare can be performed in unison or
separately, bringing into harmony the PLA’s actions,
the intent of the Communist Party, and the goals of
the senior party leadership.
In the public opinion (or media) warfare effort, the
PLA wants to influence both domestic and international public opinion in ways that build support for
China’s own military operations, while undermining
any justification for an adversary who is taking actions
counter to China’s interests. In the conduct of psychological warfare, the PLA seeks to undermine the will
of foreign civil populations and the enemy’s ability to
conduct combat operations. The PLA’s psychological
warfare goals are to demoralize both enemy military
personnel and their countrymen at home. In legal
warfare, the PLA seeks to use international law and
domestic law to justify its own actions and assert its
interests while it undermines the case for an adversary’s actions. Legal warfare also tries to establish an
argument by precedent in customary international
law for China’s position on an issue, when possible,
by tying the matter to domestic law in China.111
Media (Public Opinion) Warfare.112
The idea in public-opinion warfare is to use all
forms of media to influence both domestic and international public opinion on the rectitude of China’s
policies and actions. This includes newspapers, television, radio, social media, and the use of front organizations to convey messages to foreigners. Some of
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these activities are close to traditional propaganda
operations, but others border on sophisticated deception operations or perception management.113 In this
sense, psychological warfare and media warfare have
similarities.
Inside China, the PLA (and the Communist Party) want to guide public opinion to conform to party
policy and objectives, and to ensure that workers, the
intelligentsia, and the populace understand and embrace the party’s line on matters. When aimed at Taiwan, media warfare efforts are designed to promote a
“united front” between the citizens of Taiwan and the
Chinese Communist Party on specific policy issues.
The Communist Party’s International Liaison Department and the GPD take the lead on Taiwan-related
“united front” operations.
Internationally, media warfare efforts seek to
counter the dominance (hegemony) of the Western
media, while promoting the Communist Party’s positions and views. These efforts are increasingly sophisticated and include such measures as inserting paid
advertisements, written like news articles from Chinese publications, into American or other target foreign newspapers. In assessing this phenomenon, the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2011 report to Congress noted as an example
that China Daily, a Communist Party–affiliated stateowned newspaper, paid for inserts in newspapers
such as The Washington Post and The New York Times.
The insert made the argument that one-party rule in
China benefits both American and Chinese economic
policies because it keeps harmony in Chinese society
and keeps the steady production of goods at cheap
prices for the U.S. economy.114 The obvious objective
of such advertising efforts is to attempt to discourage
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Americans and their elected representatives from putting any emphasis on human rights in China.
China Central Television (CCTV) also has a number of stations operating overseas—broadcasting in
the native language of the host country and in Chinese—carrying the targeted messages of the Chinese
Communist Party. Often these broadcasts feature
military shows depicting PLA exercises or training
and military life, documentaries on China’s military
history, and features that highlight how the PLA is
contributing to international peace and stability.
In the broader national realm of perception management and image shaping, an initiative by the
Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
Ministry of Education to establish Confucius Institutes in foreign universities around the globe with
funding from China is another sophisticated example
of public opinion warfare that seeks to “use foreigners as a bridge” to promote and convey the message
of the Chinese government and Communist Party.
The institutes provide services, such as language and
cultural instruction, on the campuses and in the communities where they are located. Some Americans,
however, argue that Confucius Institutes are a way to
engage in “soft power diplomacy,” shaping opinions
about China.115
Turning back to the PLA, one way the PLA contributes to perception management and image shaping is through senior officers’ visits to other countries.
Senior Chinese military leaders visiting the United
States often use speeches and other forms of public
diplomacy to develop themes consistent with China’s
defense and security interests. For example, when
PLA General Chen Bingde, the chief of the General
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Staff Department, delivered a speech in the United
States in May 2011, he emphasized China’s peaceful
military tradition and the need for the United States
to respect China’s “core interests,” such as its control
over Taiwan.116
Another tactic in media warfare is to open for selective study the parts of the PLA that help deliver
the message that the GPD and the Propaganda Department want delivered to foreign audiences while
concealing other areas of PLA activity. This effort is
designed to influence foreign observers’ perceptions
of China in a way that serves the purposes of the
Communist Party and PLA. Domestically, the effort is
designed to reinforce stability and Communist Party
control around China.
One way that the GPD seeks to shape messages
to foreigners is to sponsor visits to China by foreign
groups with military affiliations, by military retirees,
and by veterans groups—visits that include tours and
contact with selected PLA personnel. The group that
is often used as a proprietary organization for such
activities is the China Association for International
Friendly Contact (CAIFC). CAIFC is controlled by the
GPD, but it also works closely with the Chinese Communist Party’s International Liaison Department and
the PLA’s Military Intelligence Department in choosing its foreign targets. The author accompanied American groups invited or sponsored by CAIFC around
China while he was a military attaché in the 1980s
and 1990s. American targets included business people
involved in heavy industry, electronics, aviation or
defense, and leaders of veterans organizations. Invariably, on the Chinese side, the escorts came from the
PLA’s Military Intelligence Department.117 The GPD
maintains its own liaison department, subordinate to
which is an intelligence bureau and the CAIFC.118
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One recent propaganda and perception management initiative by the GPD and CAIFC involved a
multiyear program to bring retired senior U.S. generals and admirals to China to meet with their retired
PLA counterparts. In the Sanya Initiative, the meetings took place in the town of Sanya on Hainan Island,
which has a climate similar to Hawaii’s.119 The lead
for the Chinese side was General Xiong Guangkai, the
former PLA chief of military intelligence.120 The Sanya
Initiative sought to soften the views of the U.S. military toward China and to influence the United States
to reduce arms sales to Taiwan. The American participants reportedly were encouraged to return home and
meet with active military leaders, informing them of
what they learned from the trip.
Media warfare, or public opinion warfare, generally is targeted against both domestic and foreign
audiences. Both audiences are influenced to adopt the
main line from the Chinese Communist Party’s Liaison Department and GPD, sometimes acting through
the latter’s “loose” cover organization, CAIFC.
Psychological Warfare.
The second of the three forms of warfare has a
longer history and primarily targets enemies and potential adversaries. Psychological warfare has been a
central responsibility of the GPD since it was established. The PLA targeted Nationalist forces and the
Japanese with psychological operations and also used
them in the Korean War. The PLA believes that this
form of warfare serves national defense. It targets the
adversary’s will to fight and is designed to lower the
efficiency of enemy forces by creating dissent, disaffection, and dissatisfaction in their ranks.121
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Historically in China, psychological operations involved the use of stratagem (moulue) and deception. In
its psychological warfare operations, the PLA may target an enemy’s values, its motivation for fighting, and,
in peacetime or wartime, the logic of an adversary’s
foreign policy, security policy, or national decisions.122
In this sense, psychological operations may target an
adversary’s civil populace and its leaders, as well as
military personnel. Historically, psychological warfare operations also were intended to divide alliances.
The PLA’s objectives were to cause an adversary’s allies to take a neutral position or become disaffected
from the ally. This is still the focus of psychological
operations today.
Quoting a former U.S. military attaché to China,
one study sums up the means and methods of PLA
psychological operations this way:
Political signals may be sent through (1) public or private diplomacy at international organizations, such
as the United Nations, and/or directly to other governments or persons; (2) the use of the Chinese and
foreign media in official statements or opinion pieces
written by influential persons; (3) nonmilitary actions,
such as restrictions on travel or trade; or (4) by using
military demonstrations, exercises, deployments, or
tests, which do not involve the use of deadly force.”123

In an analysis of the PLA’s psychological warfare
operations, Mark Stokes, a former U.S. Air Force attaché in China, quotes PLA strategist Yu Guohua, stating in China Military Science that the PLA:
should sap the enemy’s morale, disintegrate their will
to fight, ignite the anti-war sentiment among citizens
at home, heighten international and domestic conflict,
weaken and sway the will to fight among its high level
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decision makers, and in turn lessen their superiority in
military strength.124

When the PLAN or the maritime or coastal patrol
organizations in China stage incidents with foreign
navies or fishing fleets, they are engaging in psychological operations. Such actions intimidate neighbors
and other claimants to disputed territories, whether in
the South China Sea or the East China Sea. By creating
the impression that acting counter to China’s interests
or desires may cause China to use force, the PLA is
able to dissuade or deter an adversary without resorting to combat.
In 1996, just before the presidential election in Taiwan, the PLA engaged in a major psychological warfare operation that, at the same time, was a display of
military force and a warning to Taiwan not to go too
far in moves toward democracy and independence.
China did not want to see Lee Teng-hui become the
first popularly elected president of Taiwan. Chinese
military officers sought to meet with foreign military
attachés in Beijing, including the author, to tell them
that if the election went to Lee, it could mean immediate war. The PLA then conducted a series of military
exercises off the Taiwan coast, firing ballistic missiles
into preannounced impact zones at sea in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, conducting an amphibious
exercise, and leading artillery practice. Before the exercises, the PLA announced to international shipping
and aviation that certain areas of airspace and the sea
would be danger zones because of the exercises and
that all aircraft and ships should avoid them.125 The
PLA’s choice of the impact zones, which bracketed
Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, had the effect of a temporary blockade or embargo of shipping and air travel
to Taiwan.
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Beijing’s message to the people of Taiwan was,
“Vote the wrong way, and you face a missile attack.”
To other countries, especially the United States, which
has encouraged free elections in Taiwan, the message
was that Taiwan was a major concern of China and if
events went the wrong way, China would use military
force.
Unfortunately for the PLA and the Communist
Party leadership, this psychological warfare campaign backfired. On March 23, 1996, Lee became the
first democratically elected president of Taiwan, with
54 percent of the vote. When the PLA missile-firing exercises began on March 8, 1996, President Bill Clinton
announced that two U.S. carrier battle groups would
be dispatched to the area around Taiwan. The carriers stayed in the area throughout the PLA exercises,
which ended on March 25, 1996, after Taiwan’s presidential election.126
The PLA sees psychological warfare as an integral
part of the three warfares and modern information
operations. Chinese legal scholars and members of the
GPD also are active in what the PLA has named “legal
warfare.”
Preparation for War and Legal Warfare.
While students of warfare are thinking through
Beijing’s military doctrine in space, other Chinese
strategists and legal scholars are engaged in an internal debate on how traditional ideas of sovereignty
and the laws of war apply in space. The authoritative PLA book, The Science of Military Strategy, puts
the legal aspects of the three warfares at the top of
its means to “influence and restrict international law
and the conduct of modern war.” The PLA sees war as
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a struggle in the military, political, economic, diplomatic, and legal domains. For the PLA, “international
law is a powerful weapon to expose the enemy, win
over sympathy and support of the international community [for China], and to strive to gain the position
of strategic initiative.” The Science of Military Strategy
further argues that one must:
publicize one’s own humanitarianism and reveal a
lot of the war crimes committed by the opponent in
violation of law so as to win over universal sympathy
and support from the international community . . . to
compel [the] opponent to bog down in isolation and
passivity.127

Those who follow China’s military development
cannot ignore this area of PLA activity. Often the arguments are nuanced and ahead of international customary law in an effort to establish a legal precedent
for China’s actions or policies. With respect to actions
in the global commons such as the seas, international
airspace, outer space, and cyberspace, the legal warfare precedents and arguments in China imply that,
before using military force, China would telegraph its
intentions or justify its planned operations through
public opinion operations or legal action.
One authoritative volume on the military legal system, The New Revolution in Military Affairs and Building
a Military Legal System (Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi
Fazhi Jianshe), explored the importance of ensuring
that the PLA sets out legal justifications for military
actions in advance of any conflict.128 The essays in this
volume imply that even now, as debates take place in
China over the range of sovereignty and China’s authority in the South China Sea or in space, the GPD of
the PLA is developing ways to justify in domestic law
38

its potential military actions. The ultimate objective is
to establish positions in domestic law that can be used
to create a precedent or to have an impact in the future
on international law and international opinion.
One reason for trying to ensure that the legal positions China seeks to take in the international arena are
grounded in its domestic laws is that the PLA believes
that this strengthens its legal arguments. In disputes
with Japan and Southeast Asian nations, Beijing now
refers to its 1992 Territorial Seas Law adopted by the
National People’s Congress as justification for its territorial claims in disputes.129 The Territorial Seas Law
extended sovereign claims over three million square
miles of area in the East and South China Seas, demarcating it as Chinese territory on its maps. After
that, when Chinese diplomats or legal representatives
argued with officials of other nations, the domestic
law was used as one of the justifications for the territorial claims. The 2005 Anti-Secession Law is another
example of how domestic law is used by Beijing to justify potential military action in the future, in this case,
against Taiwan.
To reiterate a point made in Chapter 7 of my book,
The Dragon Extends its Reach, PLA officers argue that
setting forth legal arguments for military action is important if a nation is to get international support—laying out the justification for legal warfare.130 PLA legal
preparation for a military campaign complements the
use of military force.131 The major PLA text explaining
this rationale was validated at a military-wide August
2004 critique session.132
One aspect of this is not new; since the establishment of the PRC, the Communist Party leadership
has been careful to establish a casus belli before taking
military action. Such justification has been in legal or
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political terms. Prior to the entry of PLA troops into
the Korean War, the PRC telegraphed its actions publicly with a declaration from Mao Zedong through
the Indian government.133 In the case of the 1962 SinoIndian War, Chinese diplomats and military leaders
carefully staked out their legal positions as early as 3
years before the conflict.134 They did the same in 1969
with the Soviet Union and in 1979 prior to their attack
on Vietnam. Thus, this concept of legal warfare has
roots in China’s diplomatic practice, which has been
reinforced by its leaders’ practice of modern war.
Zhang Shanxin and Pan Jiangang, two officers
from the PLA’s Xian Political Affairs College, believe
that prior to any conflict, a nation must “muster public
opinion in its favor” and conduct propaganda, psychological, and legal campaigns to ensure support for
military action. They also suggest developing domestic law that justifies military action in international legal terms. These authors see this as a means of developing “comprehensive national power” and believe
that the United States demonstrated the importance
of such actions in the period before the 2003 attack
on Iraq.135
Lu Hucheng and Zhang Yucheng, of the General
Staff Department Political Department, classify “legal
warfare” as a “special form of military operations” to
be undertaken in preparation for a conflict. Lu and
Zhang define these legal actions as “political preparation of the battlefield.” They see legal arguments,
propaganda, and international agreements worked in
advance as justifying any necessary military action.136
Why is this concept of legal warfare important?
In the recent past, Chinese scholars have set out their
views on national sovereignty, sovereignty in space,
and the need for “space control” in modern war.
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These actions are consistent with this concept of legal
warfare, and, should any conflict come about in space,
they would provide the outlines of any PLA justification for military action. Monitoring the outlines of
the PLA’s legal warfare arguments is important. It is
also critical that American military theorists interact
with Chinese scholars and diplomats when possible
as a means of limiting their ability to define the justifications for conflict and evolving international law on
their own terms.
Justifying China’s actions in international law and
establishing positions in domestic law increasingly are
important for the PLA as its strategists and planners
think about space warfare. Officers in the GPD are setting out positions now that China can use in the future
to justify attacks on foreign satellites or other space
bodies, while other scholars in China deal with the
limits and range of national sovereignty in the global
commons. These legal warfare efforts are designed to
establish positions in domestic and international law
as a legal basis for military action or as a mean of limiting the freedom of action of other nations.137
China is developing its own ballistic missile defenses and has tested them against an incoming Chinese
warhead. However, that does not mean China thinks
the United States should field missile defenses.138 The
PLA is very aware of the deep political schisms in the
United States over renewed nuclear testing, placing
even defensive weapon systems in space, and the foreign basing of American forces. Debate rages in Congress, the scientific community, academia, and the policy community on these issues, with near-theological
disputes taking place on issues of nuclear testing and
ballistic missile defense. PLA legal warfare efforts are
applied in these areas at academic conferences and in
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meetings with foreigners to reinforce agreement with
Chinese positions. It is likely that the concept of legal
warfare will be applied to these disputes as well.
The author was once invited to an international
conference in England run by a group of British pacifists to debate issues related to arms control and space.
The English group’s partner from China was the Chinese Association for Peace and Disarmament. However, when I met the members of the Chinese delegation,
I saw that four of them were either PLA officers or
Ministry of State Security (MSS) officers I had met in
China at other arms control events. In England, however, they operated under cover and identified themselves as “disarmament researchers.”
China’s “Peaceful Rise” Theory
as a Case Study of the Three Warfares.
The PLA has managed to act globally in its media
and propaganda campaigns and is increasingly able to
do so in a nuanced way. The promulgation of China’s
“peaceful rise” as a new theory of international relations through a major propaganda campaign is a good
example of a relatively successful effort designed to
reassure China’s neighbors and the world that China
has peaceful intentions.139
In April 1998, four of China’s national security
scholars published a book discussing the theory of
how China can rise peacefully as an international
power without upsetting the international system.140
(Earlier in their careers, some of these scholars were
affiliated with the MSS.) The book examines how the
rise of China as a world power (or superpower) can
take place in such a way as to avoid war and another
Cold War.141 The authors began their work on the theo-

42

ry in 1994 and, through the China Philosophy Society,
further researched the topic. With respect to Southeast Asia, one of the scholars, Yan Xuetong, explained
that the strategists who had developed the theory of
China’s peaceful rise designed it as a response to the
“China threat theory” advanced at the time by former
Prime Minister and Minister Mentor Lee Kuan-yew of
Singapore and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of
Malaysia.142
Later, the Central Communist Party School was the
major actor in promulgating the peaceful rise theory
internationally, an effort led by its executive vice president, Zheng Bijian. When he moved on to chair the
China Reform Forum, a Communist Party–affiliated
organization, Zheng continued to discuss the theory,
and he advanced it at the Bo’ao Forum on Hainan Island in 2003.143 The Bo’ao Forum for Asia is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization (NGO) committed
to regional economic integration in Asia that meets
annually at its permanent site, Bo’ao, Hainan Island,
China. In 2005, he published a version of his speech,
“China’s Peaceful Rise,” in the magazine of the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs.144
The peaceful rise theory is an interesting one. It
suggests that China’s rise as a great power is inevitable
and that the different interests of a rising power and
an existing superpower in the same region will create
friction. Implicit, however, is the suggestion that it is
up to the United States, as the lone superpower in the
world, to accommodate China’s rise.145 Some American scholars have argued that the rise of great powers
usually creates instability in the international system,
particularly when those powers are nondemocratic
states. The Americans cited the cases of Germany and
Japan in the lead-up to the world wars as examples
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of the tension created by rising powers as they confront leading powers. Zheng responded with a new
formulation:
Our path is different from both the paths of Germany
in World War I and Germany and Japan in World
War II, when they tried to overhaul the world political landscape by way of aggressive wars. Our path is
also to be different from that of the former U.S.S.R.
[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] during the reign
of Brezhnev, which relied on a military bloc and arms
race in order to compete with the United States for
world supremacy.146

It was not only CCP intellectuals who put forth
the formula. On December 10, 2003, Premier Wen
Jiabao told an audience at Harvard University that,
as a developing country, China would seek to rise
peacefully as it resolves its natural resource and energy problems.147 Sixteen days later, celebrating the
110th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth, Hu Jintao
told an audience that China would “develop along its
own socialist course . . . and would follow a peaceful
road to development.”148 Hu repeated the formulation
on February 23, 2004, to a Politburo study meeting of
senior CCP leaders, telling them that the peaceful development path would also follow a policy of self-reliance.149 In addition, on March 14, 2004, Wen repeated
the theory, telling a session of the National People’s
Congress that although China’s peaceful rise would
take a long time, it would not depart from the general
interests of the world.150
The PLA and some in the Chinese Communist Party did not accept the peaceful rise formulation without
some internal debate. At a meeting of senior PLAAF
officers in May 2004, Jiang Zemin suggested that per-
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haps the formulation should be set aside, since the thesis potentially limited China’s military development
and modernization. His objection was both a manifestation of the friction between himself and Hu Jintao in
the transfer of his power to Hu and a demonstration
of genuine concern within the PLA that it could continue to modernize and strengthen.151 In the end, after
some period of debate, the Chinese Communist Party
arrived at the position that “there is no contradiction
between military modernization or military strength
and China’s peaceful rise.”152 China’s policymakers in
the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party see military development as complementing China’s peaceful
rise and feel that accommodating this rise requires an
adjustment in attitude by the United States and Southeast Asian nations.153
There are unspoken elements in the peaceful rise
formulation. An analogy that illustrates Beijing’s attitude toward the peaceful rise debate is to imagine
oneself walking down the middle of a sidewalk when
another person comes unseen from around a corner
and walks in your direction. That person’s course does
not deviate, as he or she expects you to shift your own
course to accommodate his or hers. Failure to accommodate the new arrival could be interpreted as hostile
and a direct challenge toward him or her. Moreover,
since the path of the new arrival is not shifting, any
failure to adjust your route could result in a clash. In
discussions in Beijing and Shanghai in 2004 and 2005,
some Chinese scholars made it clear to the author that
the peaceful rise thesis implied that China expected
other powers such as the United States to shift policy
to accommodate China. However, in Southeast Asia,
the campaign to promote the peaceful rise theory
was relatively successful and won Beijing increased
diplomatic influence.
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The PLA part of the action is a series of military-tomilitary dialogues around Southeast Asia reassured
China’s neighbors of its peaceful intentions. Unfortunately for the PLA and the makers of China’s foreign
policy, a generally more aggressive policy on disputed territories, resource claims, and fishing rights in
the South China Sea by the PLA and China’s maritime
surveillance authorities undermined several years of
diplomatic effort.154
Responding to the Three Warfares.
Much of the PLA’s campaign, whether in public
opinion and media warfare or psychological warfare,
depends on the fact that Westerners in general enjoy a
free press. Thus, the PLA seems to believe that by constantly repeating its message in the Western press and
in other forms of contact, it will be accepted. In China,
there is no free press, and the PLA uses the controlled
media there and Hong Kong’s Communist-controlled
media to deliver its message to the Chinese populace.
In the United States and other Western countries,
the free press remains the major counter to China and
the PLA’s controlled messages. Most reporters are
careful enough or cynical enough not to accept every
message they are given; they check facts. Still, many
Americans have no idea that the China Association for
International Friendly Contact is controlled by an intelligence bureau under the PLA’s GPD. Nor are most
Americans or others in the West aware of the relationships among the Military Intelligence Department
of the PLA, its GPD counterpart, and CAIFC. Public
education, therefore, also is an excellent way to counter the PLA’s efforts at public opinion, or media, and
perception management; and psychological warfare.
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The U.S. Government is working to counter China’s internal propaganda campaigns through broadcasts on media outlets such as Voice of America or
Radio Free Asia as a means to keep Chinese citizens
informed. The Internet and social media also make it
more difficult for the PLA to succeed with the type
of controlled molding of public opinion it conducts.
However, that does not stop the Chinese government
from working to control social media and the Internet
as well as to identify Internet activists.155 This vying
for public opinion and countering of propaganda is
an example of one area in which the PLA has become
more sophisticated, and its reach more global. In legal
warfare, the PLA may be ahead. Few American legal
or military scholars are engaging in arguments in legal
journals that counter China’s positions. At U.S. military schools and headquarters, there is no systematic
effort to establish precedent or to counter some of the
PLA’s positions. International awareness of the PLA’s
strategy would be useful, making this another area in
which public education could be the most effective
counterbalance to propaganda.
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